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I. INTRODUCTION
This decade has seen ever-increasing case loads in both the federal
and state court systems. While the cause of the current "litigation explo-
sion" is a hotly debated topic, the undisputed result is growing dockets
and lengthening delays in bringing civil suits to trial.' Suggestions for
handling the increasing demands on court resources have ranged from
simply expanding the number of courts and judges to complicated methods
of alternative dispute resolution.2 In the pursuit of judicial efficiency, the
courts have experimented with a wide variety of alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms. A sampling of programs includes mediation, arbitra-
tion, private judging, mini-trials, and summary jury trials.
One concern of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs is
the propriety of using settlement pressure to eliminate cases from the
docket. Tension exists between pushing parties to settle earlier than on
the courthouse steps and unduly discouraging them from pursuing their
rightful claims in court. Although some ADR programs perform an
adjudicative function, the results are not binding and, thus, ADR resolves
disputes only if the parties reach an agreement.3 Sanctions are used to
increase the cost-effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution by creating
an additional incentive to adopt the ADR result, instead of proceeding to
trial. Although a certain amount of settlement pressure is permissible, the
1. For a general survey of the purported reasons for the "litigation explosion," see
generally Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 5-11 (1983).
2. See generally Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-lier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808,
1845-46 (1986) (creating a two-tier justi'e'qtem); MeMillan & Siegel, Creating a Fast-
Track Alternative under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. Rsv.
431, 431 (1985) (creating a faster time table for certain types of litigation); Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 393 (1986) (suggesting raising court filing fees).
3. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 668, 673, 675 (1986); Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537,
541, 546 (1983); McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 818, 822 (1988).
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use of sanctions is constrained by the United States Constitution, state
constitutions, and the appropriate functions of alternative dispute
resolution.
This Note will explore one form of alternative dispute resolution
and attempt to define the boundaries between acceptable pressure and
coercion. Court-annexed arbitration, specifically compulsory proceedings,
has been chosen for examination because of its inherent coercion. Unlike
purely consensual programs, mandatory court-annexed arbitration requires
the participation of the parties. The term "arbitration" is used instead of
"mediation" because these programs typically involve at least one
impartial party that sets a nonbinding award at the end of an informal
hearing.4 Court-annexed arbitration (CAA) is also referred to as court-
ordered arbitration or non-binding arbitration, to distinguish it from
binding contractual arbitration.
Part II of this Note presents an overview of court-annexed
arbitration and discusses its goals, focusing on its use as a settlement
device. Part III briefly explores challenges to the propriety of a
mandatory court-annexed program and demonstrates that absent pressure
imposed by sanctions, a mandatory program is appropriate. Finally, Part
IV analyzes commonly imposed sanctions and defines the boundaries of
acceptable pressure by reference to the policies underlying court-annexed
arbitration.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
A. A Description of a Typical Court-Annexed Arbitration Program
Court-annexed arbitration is usually implemented in an effort to
reduce court costs and backlog by encouraging litigants to settle before
judicial resources have been expended on motion practice or trial.' Court-
annexed arbitration was initially administered by local rule because of its
experimental nature, but recently has been mandated by state and federal
legislators.
4. For a definition and description of court-annexed arbitration, see Levin, supra note
3, at 537; McKay, supra note 3, at 828.
5. See S. CLARKE, L. DONNELLY & S. GROVE, COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA 7 (1989) [hereinafter COA IN NORTH CAROLINA]; D. HENSLER, A.
LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA 12-13 (1981) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA]; E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS at xii (rev. ed. 1983).
6. The initial experiment in the federal court system was administered by local rule in
three district courts. N.D. CAL. TEMP. R. 500, D. CONN. R. 38, and E.D. PA. R. 49,
reprinted in E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 99-118. The District of Connecticut
later abandoned its CAA program. Id. at 137-38. The number of federal courts with CAA
experimental programs was later increased to 10. In 1988, Congress authorized a five-year
continuation of mandatory court-annexed arbitration in those districts, and the experimental
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The first step in implementing a court-annexed arbitration program
is to define the criteria used to select cases.7 These criteria include
factors such as the complexity of the litigation, the amount in controversy,
and the subject matter of the suit.8 In a mandatory program, suits falling
within the established parameters must be submitted to court-annexed
arbitration before they will be allowed to proceed to trial. Cases are
typically selected by a court administrator or clerk, who notifies the
parties and coordinates the arbitration process.9  To increase the
effectiveness of the proceeding and prevent delay, a hearing is typically
required within a specified number of days.'0 Cases are heard by panels
of one to three arbitrators, who have been chosen for their legal
knowledge or other relevant areas of expertise." At the hearing, attorneys
use of voluntary CAA in 10 new districts. The 10 district courts with mandatory court-
annexed arbitration programs include the following: N.D. Cal., M.D. Fla., W.D. Mich.,
W.D. Mo., D.N.J., E.D.N.Y., M.D.N.C., W.D. Okla., E.D. Pa., and W.D. Tex. 28
U.S.C. § 658 (1988). State legislatures that have implemented CAA include state programs
in North Carolina and California. For a description of the operation of these programs, see
COA IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 5, at 1-2; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA,
supra note 5, at 9-14.
7. The following description of court-annexed arbitration is a compilation of several
different programs. See generally JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 5, at
22-23; K. SHUART, THE WAYNE COUNTY MEDIATION PROGRAM IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF MICHIGAN 8 (1984); Levin, supra note 3, at 538; Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 29, 32-33 (1985).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1)(B) (1988) (limiting court-annexed arbitration in the
federal courts to cases involving monetary damages less than $100,000); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1141.11, 1141.15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (civil cases in which the amount in
controversy, in the court's opinion, is less than $50,000, and exceptions granted for cause);
DEL. Sup. CT. R. 16.1(a) (all civil cases are referred to compulsory arbitration unless
counsel certifies in good faith that damages are in excess of $50,000); HAW. CIR. CT. ARB.
R. 6 (all tort cases with a probable jury award of less than $150,000); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB.
R. I (cases submitted to CAA are limited to those involving claims of less than $15,000 and
exceptions include family law, wills and estates, and class actions, among others). For a
description of the California and North Carolina programs, see also D. BRYANT, JUDICIAL
ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: AN UPDATE 6 (1989); COA IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 5, at 3.
9. See N.D. CAL. R. 500-3(a) (selection and coordination by court clerk); M.D. FLA.
R. 8.03(a) (selection and coordination by court clerk); D.N.J. R. 47(C)(1) (selection and
coordination by court clerk); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.16(a) (West 1982 & Supp.
1991) (cases submitted after a conference with all parties to determine amount in
controversy); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 8(e) (all nonjudicial functions in administrating the
program may be delegated to support personnel).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1988) (hearings must be not more than 180 days after the
answer is filed, but not less than 30 days after the court rules on motion for dismissal or
summary judgment); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 16.1(f)(1) (hearing must be scheduled within 40 days
after appointment of an arbitrator); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 8(b)(1) (hearing scheduled
within 60 days).
11. Arbitrators are often chosen by the consent of the parties, but if they cannot agree,
the court will appoint the arbitrators. N.D. CAL. R. 500-4(a) (If the parties do not consent,
they are given a list of ten potential arbitrators, with each party entitled to strike two names.
The parties then proceed, defendant first, to select a panel of three arbitrators by each
choosing one name in turn.); M.D. FLA. R. 8.03(a) (panel consists of one to three
arbitrators chosen by consent or randomly by the court clerk); D.N.J. R. 47 (D)(2) (one
arbitrator chosen by the court clerk); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 16.1(d)(2)-(4) (arbitrator chosen by
the agreement of the parties, or the court selects three alternative arbitrators and each party
eliminates one); N.C. CT. ORD. ARE. R. 2(a) (one arbitrator is agreed upon by the parties
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present their evidence in a summary fashion, and the hearing may be
limited to a specific length of time. 2 The panel then sets an award that
will be entered as the judgment, unless one of the parties moves to vacate
the award within a set number of days. 3 If either party contests the
result, the suit will go to trial with no evidentiary use of the arbitration
hearing. 4  Most courts then attempt to place the case back on the court
docket, as if it were never removed, to prevent the arbitration hearing
from substantially delaying trial.' 5
B. Court-Annexed Arbitration as a Settlement Device
Court-annexed arbitration has been instituted experimentally in a
number of courts.' 6  The goals of these programs are articulated as
providing the litigant with timely justice and easing court congestion by
removing cases from the docket at the earliest possible time.'
7
or selected at random by the court).
12. See D. CONN. R. § 7(g), (k), reprinted in E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at
103-04 (discussing presentation of witnesses and proof, and limiting proceedings to two
days); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 3(n) (proceedings limited to one hour, unless justice requires
an extension).
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 654(a), 655(a) (1988) (a trial de novo must be demanded within
30 days after the arbitrator files the award with the court, or the award is entered as
judgment); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 16.1h)(1) (demand for trial must be filed within 20 days);
N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 5(a) (demand for trial must be filed within 30 days).
14. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1988), which provides, in relevant part:
(c) Limitation on Admission of Evidence. The court shall not admit at the
trial de novo any evidence that there has been an arbitration proceeding,
the nature or amount of any award, or any other matter concerning the
conduct of the arbitration proceeding, unless-
(1) the evidence would otherwise be admissible in the
court under the Federal Rules of Evidence, or
(2) the parties have otherwise stipulated.
See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.25 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.C. CT. ORD.
ARB. R. 5(c), (d).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1988), which provides, in relevant part:
(b) Restoration to Court Docket. Upon a demand for a trial de novo, the
action shall be restored to the docket of the court and treated for all
purposes as if it had not been referred to arbitration. In such a case, any
right of trial by jury that a party otherwise would have had, as well as any
place on the court calendar which is no later than that which a party
otherwise would have had, are preserved.
See also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1141.20 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); DEL. SUP. CT. R.
16.1(h)(2).
16. Court-annexed arbitration is currently in use in 21 states and 10 United States
District Courts. Norris, National Trends in Mandatory Arbitration, THE COLORADO
LAWYER 1313, 1313 (July 1988). Ten additional district courts were authorized to
experiment with voluntary CAA in November of 1988. 28 U.S.C. § 658 (1988).
17. See JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 5, at 12; E. LIND & J.
SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 1, 5.
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Accordingly, success is measured by (1) the frequency of trial de novo;
(2) the cost to the litigants; (3) litigant and attorney satisfaction; and (4)
the timeliness of adjudication and backlog reduction.' Under these
criteria, a program succeeds by encouraging parties to settle as early as
possible, before otherwise utilizing court resources. The Constitution also
limits the function of court-annexed arbitration to that of a settlement
device rather than a true alternative adjudication. A program that
substituted for trial and bound the participants to the result would be
unconstitutional. 9
Characterizing the process as a settlement device in no way
detracts from its legitimacy. Since the current settlement rate is 90-95
percent, 20 protesting the use of court-annexed arbitration on the grounds
that it merely encourages settlement ignores the realities of our judicial
system. Given the high settlement rate, court-annexed arbitration simply
encourages the most probable result and introduces an element of
objectivity not present in traditional settlement negotiations. 21 A well-
designed program encourages those parties that will settle to do so at an
earlier time, but leaves others free to pursue their litigation in court
without undue penalty. Striking this proper balance is crucial to achieving
the goals of court-annexed arbitration.
The proper balance can be determined by examining the settlement
process. Settlement occurs when parties reach consensus as to the value
of their claim and the undesirability of going forward with litigation.
=
Suits fail to settle when the parties desire vindication, the attorneys have
not completed the preparation necessary to evaluate the case, the parties
or the attorneys do not realistically value the claim, or both sides are
reluctant to propose settlement negotiations. 2 Court-annexed arbitration
can help remove each of these barriers. Parties are given the opportunity
to present their cases, with the objective input of a third party serving to
18. For a discussion of a model to evaluate the success of a program, see COA IN
NORTH CAROUNA, supra note 5, at 15-23; E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 12-16.
19. See Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 565. For a discussion of the constitutionality of court-annexed
arbitration, see generally N. ROGERS & C. MCEWEN, MEDIATION 53-54 (1989); Golann,
supra; Levin & Golash, supra note 7, at 45-46.
20. It is estimated that 93% of civil actions in the federal courts never reach tria;. Of
course some of these cases are terminated in ways other than settlement, for example,
dismissal. Levin, supra note 3, at 541 & n.23 (citing DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. 381, Table C-4 (1981)).
21. See COA IN NORTH CAROUNA, supra note 5, at 78 (CAA appears to replace
settlement rather than adjudication). See also Levin, supra note 3, at 545-47. Levin
discusses the dangers of treating CAA as a settlement device rather than as an adjudication.
He emphasizes the importance in dealing with the litigants' clams on their merits to
encourage perceptions of fairness and discourage resort to trial de novo. Id.
22. For a formal economic model of settlement, see Posner, supra note 2, at 369-71.
23. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 9-11, 78-80.
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deflate unrealistic expectations of the parties or their counsel.24 Attorneys
must evaluate their cases in preparation for the hearing and are in a
position to consider settlement.2 Because the court selects cases for
arbitration, neither party has to admit weakness by proposing settlement
talks. By removing these obstacles to settlement, court-annexed
arbitration helps parties reach consensus faster, which serves their
interests as well as those of the judicial system.
An effective program must remove traditional obstacles to
settlement without substituting new ones. Court-annexed arbitration
cannot function if it is perceived as unfair because participants will not
readily agree to an unfair award.2 The parties will discount the award
and the entire process, which will alienate litigants while failing to
facilitate settlement.27  Another unproductive influence is
overformalization. A complicated process, a binding result, or heavy-
handed sanctions all increase the dangers of delaying tactics and side
litigation.2 Fairness and a degree of informality are necessary to foster
settlement without increasing the costs to the parties, the judicial system,
and the public.
III. COMMON CHALLENGES TO COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAMS
A. Court-Annexed Arbitration and Constitutional Concerns
One challenge to court-annexed arbitration is that the mandatory
process itself is unduly coercive. Court-annexed arbitration has been
challenged under state constitutions and the United States Constitution as
violating the right to trial by jury, the equal protection clause, and the due
24. For a brief discussion of the value of third-party evaluation, see Rowe, American
Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation, Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 899.
25. Although the proceedings are not as formal as trial, the attorneys must present their
cases and can be sanctioned for failure to participate. See Gilling v. Eastern Airline, 680 F.
Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988) (failure to participate in arbitration by presenting no evidence on
certain claims was sanctioned by imposing the other party's costs to prepare for arbitration);
Wahle v. Medical Center of Delaware, 559 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1989) (plaintiffs suit dismissed
for abuse of arbitration process, including repeated delay and refusal to furnish requested
information). But see Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(petitioner cannot be sanctioned for failing to send a representative with settlement authority
to court-ordered mediation).
26. The importance of a fair procedure is the element where the dual functions of CAA
as a settlement device and adjudication intersect. The arbitration hearing must be credible
(by at least partially resembling an adjudication) in order to serve its purpose as a settlement
device. See Levin, supra note 3, at 546-47.
27. Id.
28. Lind and Shapard speculate that there is a tension between formal structure and the
goals of court-annexed arbitration: increased formality may raise perceptions of fairness
while increasing costs and delay. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 90.
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process clause." Generally, courts have upheld mandatory programs
against these attacks."
The right to a jury trial is not absolute and is not violated unless
the procedure engenders undue delay or expense to the degree that it
denies the parties the opportunity to proceed to trial.3" For constitutional
purposes, the saving feature of mandatory ADR is that trial de novo is
available at the request of either party.32 The mandatory nature of court-
annexed arbitration, standing alone, does not violate litigants'
constitutional rights.
B. Court-Annexed Arbitration and the Rule-Making Authority of
the Federal Courts
Mandatory alternative dispute resolution in the federal courts has
been challenged as an improper use of the courts' rule-making authority.
Due to their experimental nature, alternative dispute resolution programs
are often implemented in the federal courts by local rule.33 The courts
have rule-making authority under 28 U.S.C. Section 2071 to promulgate
29. See Rhea v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (seventh
amendment right to jury trial); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (seventh amendment right to jury trial); Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 462 F.
Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978) (seventh amendment right to jury trial), af'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th
Cir. 1980); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (state constitutional
right to jury trial and equal protection); Firelock, Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090
(Colo. 1989) (en bane) (various provisions of Colorado Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment right to procedural due process); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980)
(due process under U.S. and Florida Constitution); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980) (state constitutional right to jury trial). For an analysis of the
constitutionality of mandatory ADR, see generally Golann, supra note 19.
30. See Rhea v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1985);
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Davison v. Sinai Hosp.
of Baltimore, 462 F. Supp. 778, 781, n.78 (D. Md. 1978); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz.
576, 580, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Firelock v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Colo.
1989) (en bane). But see Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 237-38 (Fla. 1980) (rigid time
schedule that operates to deprive some parties of right to mediate violates due process under
the state and federal constitutions); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 388, 421 A.2d 190
(1980) (mandatory scheme does not of itself violate right to jury trial, but oppressive delay
does).
31. Golann, supra note 19, at 566. See Rhea v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266,
268 (6th Cir. 1985); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978); Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Firelock v. District Court, 776 P.2d
1090, 1100 (Colo. 1989) (en bane). But see Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 388, 421
A.2d 190 (1980) (oppressive delay violated right to jury trial).
32. See, N. ROGERS & C. MCEWEN, supra note 19, at 53-54; Levin & Golash, supra
note 7, at 45-46.
33. For a description of the first three court-annexed arbitration programs in the federal
district courts and the applicable local rules, see Levin &, Golash, supra note 7, at 32 n.15.
Since May 1989, the Judicial Improvements Act has regulated mandatory court-annexed
arbitration in the federal courts, but the Act allows the district court to set many details by
local rule. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988). See also N.D. OHIO R. 17.02 (granting judge
authority to order a summary jury trial or other ADR mechanism).
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rules that are not otherwise inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or federal statutes?6 In addition to their inherent rule-making
authority, courts derive authority to order ADR from Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5  Challenges to court authority in this
area have two prongs: (1) local rules are an inappropriate method of
implementing significant changes; and (2) courts are not granted the
authority to impose ADR on litigants by Rule 16.
In determining the limits of local rule-making authority,
commentators tend to use one of two approaches. The more conservative
view is that court rules should be used only to facilitate the administration
of court business?6 Court rules that are substantive rather than procedural
create serious inconsistencies among courts? 7 Other commentators have
urged that the flexibility inherent in local rules should be used to full
advantage to permit experimentation with various test programs such as
alternative dispute resolution.38
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988) provides that "[tihe Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of
their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court." Rule 83 provides that:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof
may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an
opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not
inconsistent with these rules. A local rule so adopted shall take effect
upon the date specified by the district court and shall remain in effect
unless -amended by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of
the circuit in which the district is located. Copies of rules and
amendments so made by any district court shall upon their promulgation
be frnished to the judicial council and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and be made available to the public. In all cases not
provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the
district in which they act.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
35. Rule 16 provides in relevant part:
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The
participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action
with respect to
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use
of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute;
[and] (10) the need for adopting special
procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues,
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual
proof problems[.]
36. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3152
(1982).
37. Id.
38. Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation or
Information?, 14 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 213, 218, 219, 275 (1981).
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Within their sphere of authority, courts are given discretionary
power to promulgate rules." The courts' inherent powers have not been
tightly circumscribed and are given wide deference. 4° Nevertheless, courts
may not directly contradict a rule or statute, or create rules that affect the
outcome of the litigation.4! ' The fact that courts are granted wide
discretion in rule-making does not dispose of the issue of court authority
to order alternative dispute resolution. Because of the extraordinary
nature of imposing ADR on unwilling litigants, courts must look beyond
their inherent powers for authority.42
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may authorize
court-annexed arbitration. The 1983 Amendments to Rule 16 can be read
as authorizing various forms of extrajudicial proceedings to encourage
settlement. 43 The majority of courts reviewing this question have found
alternative dispute resolution consistent with the Federal Rules and have
impliedly assumed that Rule 16 authorizes ADR.4
Though the first court-annexed arbitration programs in the federal
courts were administered by local rule, Congress statutorily authorized
twenty district courts to experiment with court-annexed arbitration in
1988. 41 The Judicial Improvements Act sets jurisdictional limits, sanctions
parties that request trial and fail to improve upon the arbitral award, and
regulates various other administrative matters, while still allowing each
court to use its local rules to tailor its program.4 Because the courts have
been granted explicit statutory authority to mandate court-annexed
arbitration, the federal programs are immune from attacks based on the
power of the federal courts to require compulsory nonbinding arbitration.
However, the local rules implemented by each federal court must be
39. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83.
40. See Levin & Golash, supra note 7, at 49.
41. Levin & Golash, supra note 7, at 50-51. See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 648
(1960) (striking local rule regarding oral depositions that was inconsistent with Admiralty
Rules). Cf. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1973) (local rule that provided for
six-person rather than twelve-person jury was permissible).
42. Prior to the passage of the Judicial Improvements Act, the federal district courts
that implemented court-annexed arbitration did so under the authority of a Justice
Department experiment, funded by Congress. Levin & Golash, supra note 7, at 32 n.15.
For a history of court-annexed arbitration in the federal courts prior to the passage of the
Act, see HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
ACT, H.R. REP. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-34, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5982, 5991-94.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(10).
44. See Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1988);
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979). But see Strandell v.
Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Note, Incongruity in the
Seventh Circuit: Do Federal Courts Have the Authority to Order Sununary Jury Trials?, 6
OHIO ST. J. DiS. RES. 131 (1990).
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988).
46. Id.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
consistent with the applicable provisions of the Judicial Improvements
Act.
47
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF SANCTIONS USED TO INCREASE SETTLEMENT
PRESSURE IN COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
A. An Overview of Commonly Imposed Sanctions
To insure that court-annexed arbitration is effective, many courts
use sanctions to encourage the parties to accept the panel's decision.
Sanctions attempt to maximize the benefits of the program by discouraging
subsequent trials.4  Proponents of sanctions theorize that litigants will
never accept the arbitrator's recommendation unless significant costs are
associated with rejecting it.49  Courts have used a variety of sanctions,
including attorney's fees, arbitrator's fees, and court costs."° Sanctions
discourage trial de novo by penalizing parties that demand trial, but do
not improve upon the arbitrator's decision. Court-annexed arbitration also
influences litigants' behavior by creating an additional delay and the
additional expense of preparing for the mandatory hearing. The
remainder of this Note will be devoted to evaluating different sanctions
and settlement pressures that are utilized by court-annexed arbitration
programs.
B. Assessing Attorney's Fees
Assessing attorney's fees is the costliest of the three sanctions
previously listed and is currently authorized in a handful of state court-
annexed arbitration programs."
At one time, attorney's fees were imposed as a sanction in the
federal courts. In the Western District of Michigan, local rules allowed a
party to assess actual costs against his opponent, including attorney's
fees. 2 Costs were shifted to the plaintiff who failed to accept the panel's
47. Id.
48. See Levin, supra note 3, at 538.
49. See JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 5, at 17-18; Levin, supra
note 3, at 539.
50. See E.D. PA. R. 8, 7(E) (imposing arbitrator's fees); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1141.21 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (imposing arbitrator's fees and costs); HAW. CIR. CT.
ARB. R. 25, 26 (imposing attorney's fees, limited to $5,000, and costs).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.06.060 (West Supp. 1991) (authorizes the supreme court to
implement a rule that would permit the imposition of attorney's fees); see HAW. CiR. CT.
ARB. R. 25, 26 (allowing the imposition of attorney's fees up to $5,000).
52. W.D. MICH. R. 42. The relevant parts of the rule read as follows:
Rule 42. Mediation
0) Effect of Mediation
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unanimous decision, and received a court judgment less than 10 percent
greater than the panel's evaluation.3 Likewise, costs were shifted to the
defendant who failed to accept the panel's decision and had a judgment
entered against him that was greater than 90 percent of the
recommendation.m The Sixth Circuit held that the court did not have the
power to shift attorney's fees by local rule.5 The opinion relied on the
exceptional nature of the remedy of charging attorney's fees and stated
that the remedy is appropriate only when Congress has expressly created
an exception to the American rule. 6
Congress has since declined to authorize the use of attorney's fees
to encourage acceptance of awards obtained through court-annexed
arbitration. The Judicial Improvements Act prevents federal courts from
imposing any costs on parties involved in mandatory court-annexed
arbitration, other than the arbitrator's fees.57 The Act does permit the
(3) If the mediation panel's evaluation is unanimous and the
defendant accepts the evaluation but the plaintiff rejects it and
the matter proceeds to trial, the plaintiff must obtain a verdict in
an amount which, when interest on the amount and costs from
the date of filing of the complaint to the date of the evaluation
are added, is more than ten (10) percent greater than the
evaluation in order to avoid the payment of actual costs to the
defendant.
(6) For good cause shown, the Court may order relief from
payment of any or all costs as set out in subsections 0)(3)
through G)(5), above.
(k) Actual Costs. Actual costs include those costs and fees taxable in any
civil action and attorney's fees for each day of trial as may be determined
by the Court.
Although this is a mediation rule, the Michigan program in question is mandatory, and the
hearing panel may recommend an award at the end of the proceeding. In these aspects, the
program resembles arbitration more than mediation. See N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, supra
note 19, at 77.
53. W.D. MiCH. R. 420)(3), reprinted infra note 52.
54. W.D. MICH. R. 420)(4).
55. Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88, 94 (6th Cir. 1988).
Although this case involved the local rule regarding mediation (Rule 42), the mediation
process involved was similar to arbitration in that the mediator could enter an award. The
Western District of Michigan has a similar rule regarding court-annexed arbitration with
similar provisions. W.D. MICH. R. 436)(4).
56. Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88, 93 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. (d) Taxation of Arbitrator Fees as Cost.
(1) (A) A district court may provide by rule that, in any trial de
novo under this section, arbitrator fees paid under § 657 may be taxed as
costs against the party demanding the trial de novo.
(13) Such rule may provide that a party demanding a trial de
novo under subsection (a), other than the United States or its agencies or
officers, shall deposit a sum equal to such arbitrator fees as advanced
payment of such costs, unless the party is permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis.
(2) Arbitrator fees shall not be taxed as costs under paragraph (1)(A), and any
deposited under paragraph (1)(B) shall be returned to the party demanding the trial
de novo, if-
(A) the party demanding the trial de novo obtains a finaljudgment more favorable than the arbitration award, or
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imposition of attorney's fees on parties that submit to voluntary arbitration
and then demand a trial de novo, but only if (1) the party does not obtain
a substantially more favorable result at trial; and (2) the court finds
evidence of bad faith. 8 As enacted, the statute prevents the doubly
coercive effect of imposing a prohibitive sanction upon parties compelled
to participate in an experimental process.
Congress may nonetheless attempt to experiment with costlier
sanctions in the near future. The Senate Judiciary Committee has
recommended additional experimentation with financial incentives.
According to the Committee, "cost and fee incentives become more
appropriate as the alternative procedures move from early informal
pretrial hearings toward more formal proceedings, with significant
discovery and more extensive hearings."" The Committee also stressed
that because of the substantive overtones, incentives should be
implemented by Congress, not local rule, and only as a controlled, limited
experiment."
No court has addressed whether Congress or a state legislature
may shift attorney's fees as a sanction for demanding a trial de novo.'
The Supreme Court has indicated that taxing attorney's fees is permissible
if authorized by statute." However, unlike ADR sanctions," most fee
provisions assess fees for conduct that violates a specific statute, in order
to encourage compliance. 6  The possibility of obtaining fees encourages
(B) the court determines that the demand for the trial de novo
was made for good cause.
(4) Any rule under this subsection shall provide that no penalty for demanding a
trial de novo, other than that provided in this subsection, shall be assessed by the
court.
(e) Assessment of Costs and Attorney Fees. In any trial de novo demanded
under subsection (a) in which arbitration was done by the consent of the parties, a district
court may assess costs, as provided in § 1920 of this title, and reasonable attorney fees
against the party demanding the trial de novo if-
(1) such party fails to obtain a judgment, exclusive of interest and costs,
in the court which is substantially more favorable to such party than the
arbitration award, and
(2) the court determines that the party's conduct in seeking a trial de novo
was in bad faith.
28 U.S.C. § 655.
58. Id. § 655(e).
59. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 83-85 (April 2, 1990).
60. Id. at 84-85.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 92. Golann notes that "the most difficult questions concerning impairment ofjury trial rights arise from ADR penalties." Golann, supra note 19, at 510.
63. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 249 (1975).
64. But see Golann, supra note 19, at 510-11. Golann uses the existence of a multitude
of other fee-shifting statutes as evidence that cost shifting in connection with mandatory
ADR is constitutionally permissible.
65. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (courts have discretion to allow the prevailing
party in civil rights litigation to recover reasonable attorney fees as part of costs).
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attorneys to bring civil suits for violations of the statute, and makes the
statute self-enforcing.6 The result is an additional penalty to those parties
adjudged at trial to have violated the statute. In contrast, a statute similar
to the Michigan local rule is enacted to encourage settlement and the
result penalizes parties for pursuing their suit to trial. The question is
whether the additional pressure to settle, when added to an already
compulsory process, is an impermissible burden on the right to a jury
trial.
The use of non-binding arbitration to shift attorney's fees is
analogous to the use of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
shift or cut-off fees.Y Rule 68 provides that if a plaintiff rejects a
settlement offer and then recovers a lower amount at trial, she cannot
collect her own costs and must pay the defendant's costs incurred after the
offer. 6' In Marek v. Chesney, the Supreme Court held that when
attorney's fees are shifted under a separate statute, costs under the Federal
Rules include attorney's fees. 69 The Court strongly favored settlement.
over litigation, stating that "application of Rule 68 will require plaintiffs
to 'think very hard' about whether continued litigation is worthwhile; that
is precisely what Rule 68 contemplates." 70  The effect of Rule 68 is
66. The legislative history to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states that "[a]ll of these civil rights
laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential
remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important
Congressional policies which these laws contain." SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5908, 5910.
67. Golann also discusses the relationship between Rule 68 and cost shifting as part of
mandatory ADR. Golann, supra note 19, at 511.
68. The Rule provides that:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to
allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or
property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costa. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree .must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but
not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of
one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment,
but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by
further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of
judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if
it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the
commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
69. Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
70. Id. at 10-11.
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somewhat mitigated by the fact that it does not apply when the plaintiff
loses at trial.7
In Marek v. Chesney, the Supreme Court decisively favored
settlement over litigation and allowed fee-shifting to encourage
settlement. 72 A reasonable extension of this rationale is that attorney's
fees may be statutorily imposed against parties that do not accept the
arbitrators' award. 73  The cases referred to non-binding arbitration
typically involve contract or tort disputes and exclude suits alleging
violation of constitutional rights.74 The operation of a CAA statute would
appear to be less drastic than the Court's interpretation of Rule 68, which
applies to suits that allege constitutional violations. 5  Court-annexed
arbitration also provides additional protection for the parties by requiring
an impartial evaluation of the case. The addition of a disinterested party
prevents attempts by one party to cut-off attorney's fees by knowingly
offering an inadequate settlement figure, and using Rule 68 as a weapon
to coerce settlement. 76
The combination of compulsory arbitration and shifting attorney's
fees still raises serious questions of an impermissible burden on the right
to trial by jury.77 At least some state courts would probably invalidate
this type of statute as a violation of their state constitution's jury trial or
court access provisions.?
Even though a fee-shifting statute may be constitutional, the statute
would violate the policies underlying court-annexed arbitration. In an era
of rising fees, shifting attorney's fees can mean thousands of dollars, even
in relatively uncomplicated cases. Because of the dollar amounts
involved, imposing fees is a highly coercive sanction. Shifting attorney's
fees based on the result of a pretrial hearing threatens the parties into
settling or pursuing the matter in court at their own peril. The stronger
the pressure on the parties to accept the arbitral award, the more likely
71. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
72. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
73. See Golann, supra note 19, at 511.
74. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
75. The plaintiff in Marek v. Chesney alleged a violation of civil rights under 28
U.S.C. § 1983. 473 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
76. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 270, 315 (1989) (discusses the offensive use of Rule 68 to coerce
inadequate settlements); Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 40
(1985) (the threat of imposing attorney's fees has a greater impact on civil rights plaintiffs).
77. But see Golann, supra note 19, at 567 (concluding that imposing costs on disputants
that reject ADR results does not raise a serious constitutional question, as long as fees are
taxed only against parties that do not better their position at trial, and not as a per se cost on
all litigants).
78. Levin & Golash, supra note 7, at 57. Some states look with disfavor on any
infringements of the right to jury trial created by a mandatory hearing. See Mattos v.
Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
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they are to forego trial, regardless of their proper objections to the
award.79 The focus of court-annexed arbitration then changes from that of
a court-supervised settlement device to a substitute for trial, overlooking
the fact that the panel's decision is based on a highly abbreviated
procedure.8"
The use of heavy-handed tactics should be carefully scrutinized in
light of CAA's goal of facilitating settlement while upholding confidence
in the judicial system. Sanctions may not reduce the number of cases
settling, but still may alienate users of the system by creating perceptions
of unfairness.8 The time and expense incurred in pursuing a matter to
trial are substantial. For this and other reasons, the vast majority of cases
(90-95 percent) settle before trial." It may be impossible to significantly
reduce the already low percentage of disputes that proceed to a trial de
novo.
83
Although sanctions cannot have a large impact on the percentage of
cases settling, costly sanctions introduce an element of coercion into the
bargaining process.4 Altering the balance of settlement negotiations is
one of the goals of court-annexed arbitration, but the process is supposed
to equalize bargaining positions, not create additional pressure on litigants
with limited means.85 Costly sanctions may cause the parties to reluctantly
forego their right to trial and may undermine parties' perceptions of
fairness, which are crucial to the success of court-annexed arbitration. 6
Indeed, increased enforceability of the arbitral award may actually
lead to more trials by generating side litigationY As the award becomes
more enforceable, the proceeding itself may become more adversarial in
nature. One unproductive side effect of adversarial behavior would be
79. In discussing the impact of Rule 68, Simon concluded that sanctions strong enough
to substantially increase settlement also coerce settlement on litigants with meritorious
claims. Simon, supra note 76, at 76.
80. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
81. For the importance of maintaining the litigants' perceptions of fairness, see Levin,
supra note 3, at 546-47.
82. See Galanter, The Federal Rules and the Quality of Settlements: A Comment on
Rosenberg's, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action, 137 U. PA. L. Ray. 2231,
2232 (1989) (time, money, attention, opportunity costs, and uncertainty all affect whether a
particular case settles or proceeds to trial). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
83. For a discussion of the difficulty of targeting the small number of cases that v ill
ultimately go to trial, see Galanter, supra note 82, at 2233.
84. "Disincentives are an attempt to improve court efficiency by lowering the numbers
of parties who can afford to or dare to use the trial apparatus." N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN,
supra note 19, at 75-76.
85. Id. at 76 (sanctions have the greatest impact on parties with limited resources).
86. See Levin, supra note 3, at 546-47; Note, 'No Frills" Justice: North Carolina
Experiments with Court-Ordered Arbitration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 395, 417 (1988) (Fairness is
an important component in litigants' decision to accept arbitral award as final).
87. N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, supra note 19, at 81.
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purposeful delay.' Because speed of dispute resolution is one of the
primary goals of court-annexed arbitration, increased delay decreases the
effectiveness of the process.s As the award becomes more enforceable,
the incentive to engage in tactical maneuvering becomes greater. A
formal and adversarial process may eliminate the very benefits sought
from alternative dispute resolution.
C. Assessing Arbitrator's Fees and Other Court Costs
Parties that demand a trial de novo may also be assessed court
costs or arbitrator's fees. 90 Like attorney's fees, court costs are shifted to
parties that demand trial and fail to significantly improve upon the
arbitrator's award.9  Attorney's fees will usually be more expensive than
court costs, but costs can still represent a substantial expense. Some
courts require that arbitrator's fees be automatically collected from the
party that demands a trial de novo and refunded only if the party
improves his position at trial. 92 Other courts do not impose arbitrator's
fees until after trial.9
Provisions for imposing arbitrator's fees are fairly common among
court-annexed programs. 4  Imposing costs is somewhat less common.9 5
In Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, the court held that federal courts have the
power to impose arbitrator's fees and post-award interest by local rule.'
These sanctions were approved as "a valid deterrent for frivolous appeals
88. Increased formalization leads to increased delays due to additional preparation time.
E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 89-90. Similarly, the more final the decision, the
more preparation will be required. Some evidence that attorney behavior may delay
arbitration proceedings may be presented by California's CAA program. Cases referred to
mandatory arbitration take longer to reach disposition than cases that are submitted to CAA
voluntarily. JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 5, at 95.
89. For a general discussion of the importance of making court-annexed arbitration a
timely process, see E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 78-83. According to Lind &
Shapard, the real benefits of court-annexed arbitration derive from early pre-hearing
settlement. These benefits are maximized by adherence to early deadlines. Id. at 78-80.
90. For an example of an arbitrator's fee provision, see 28 U.S.C. § 655(d), reprinted
supra note 57.
91. See CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 1141.21 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); HAw. CIR. CT.
ARB. R. 25, 26.
92. For example, see N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 5(b) (fees are paid upon filing, refunded
if party does not improve position at trial); 28 U.S.C. § 655(d)(1)(B), reprinted supra note
57.
93. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1141.21 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); DEL. SUP. CT.
R. 16.1(h)(4).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 655(d), reprinted supra note 57; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1141.21 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 16.1(h)(4); N.C. CT. ORB. ARB.
R. 5(b).
95. See CAL. Clv. PROc. CODE § 1141.21 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REv.
CODE § 7.06.060 (West Supp. 1991); HAW. CIR. CT. ARB. R. 25, 26.
96. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 575-77 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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and a: means to promote swift, efficient dispute-resolution. "97  Thus,
unlike attorney's fees, costs and arbitrator's fees can be imposed by local
rule. One reason for the difference may be that charging costs is a
traditional sanction in the American legal system and does not affect the
functioning of the adversarial system to the same degree as does charging
attorney's fees."
As discussed in the preceding section, shifting attorney's fees after
a trial de novo is probably constitutional.' 9 Because it does not violate the
American Rule and as a penalty is significantly lower in dollar amount
than attorney's fees, imposing court costs should also survive
constitutional attack. 1°°
Congress has expressly forbidden the federal courts from using any
sanction other than arbitrator's fees against parties that reject the
arbitrator's award in a mandatory court-annexed arbitration program.101
However, court costs are still imposed as a sanction in some state
programs'02 and could be authorized for use in the federal courts at a later
date.0 3
One proper purpose of imposing costs is to have users bear part of
the costs of court-annexed arbitration and to deter frivolous appeals."n°
Sanctions should bear a reasonable relationship to the value of the suit to
deter frivolous appeals, but not unduly punish the litigant with a good
faith cause of action.103  Reasonable limits prevent undue pressure to
settle, while still shifting a portion of the system's costs to its participants.
Arbitrator's fees are less problematic than court costs or attorney's fees
because the amount is certain and usually reasonable.'°6
Even added together, limited costs and arbitrators' fees may not
provide a great deal of additional pressure to settle, but strong pressure
97. Id. at 575 (discussing the holding of Smith's Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625
(1955).
98. See Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88, 92-94 (6th Cir. 1988)
(discussion of reasons that court may not impose attorney's fees by local rule).
99. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
100. Even attorney's fees may be constitutionally shifted by statute. See supra notes
62-75 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. An interesting side note to the
current statute that limits the federal courts to the use of arbitrator's fees as sanctions is the
interaction between that statute and Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although the courts cannot impose court costs as a sanction, can a party achieve the same
result by making a settlement offer after arbitration of an amount close to the arbitral award?
104. See Levin & Golash, supra note 7, at 56 (indicating that sanctions are a deterrent
and can be considered a user's fee of sorts).
105. See id. at 56-57.
106. For example, the California Civil Code limits each arbitrator's fees to $150 per
day and fees for the panel to $250 per day. N.D. CAL. R. 500-4(d). See also N.C. CT.
ORD. ARB. R. 2(c) ($75 limit); E.D. PA. R. 8(2) ($75 limit per arbitrator).
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coerces the parties needlessly."' The litigant's own expenses and time
involved to pursue the matter to trial already pressure litigants heavily
towards settlement.'m Court-annexed arbitration should help parties agree
earlier, without adding significant costs in order to force settlement on
unwilling litigants. An additional danger of higher sanctions is increased
side litigation concerning the propriety of sanctions."m A fine hand is
necessary to maintain the delicate balance between a process that will be
effective, speedy, and fair.
D. The Expense and Delay Imposed by the Hearing
One result of a court-annexed arbitration program is the expense of
preparing for the hearing and any delay created by requiring litigants to
complete an ancillary procedure prior to trial. Although these effects are
not intended to sanction litigants, they do represent additional costs
imposed on all parties, some of which will proceed to trial. Any resulting
delay should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain user
satisfaction."0 Indeed, most programs require that cases be placed back
on the docket as if they were never removed from the system."' This
practice is obviously the most equitable, but also may be somewhat
difficult to administer."2  Absent this type of provision, the best way to
avoid unnecessary delay is to strictly enforce deadlines. For example, a
court could require that a hearing be held within ninety days after the
commencement of a suit."' As well as furthering the goal of speedy
107. See COA IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 5, at 77 (even though the North
Carolina program does not utilize any sanctions other than arbitrator's fees, some attorneys
cited the cost of the procedure as their reason for not proceeding to trial); J. ADLER, D.
HENSLER & C. NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE, How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH
COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 88 (1983) [hereinafter SIMPLE JUSTICE] (speed of disposition
is increased by allowing the parties to determine whether their case falls within the
jurisdictional dollar amounts, which in reality makes the process voluntary).
108. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076-77 (1984) (discusses financial
pressures on certain litigants to settle that will always exist because of parties differing
economic circumstances).
109. N. ROGERS & C. MCEWEN, supra note 19, at 81 (discussing the possibility of
satellite litigation); Simon, supra note 76, at 26 (discussing the conflicting pressures in
formulating sanctions).
110. See Note, supra note 86, at 412 (time limits that reduce cost increase user
satisfaction).
111. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
112. Delay in scheduling cases for trial may affect user satisfaction, but may not affect
CAA effectiveness as measured by cost-benefit analysis. See R. MACCOUN, E. LIND, D.
HENSLER, D. BRYANT & P. EBENER, ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION, AN EVALUATION OF
THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 72-73 (1988) [hereinafter N.J.
AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION] (manner in which arbitrated cases are scheduled for trial has
little effect on trial de novo rate).
113. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 78-80 (strict deadlines help increase
the benefits from CAA).
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resolution, this rule limits any additional delay imposed on the parties to a
definite period.
Another cost imposed by mandatory arbitration is the expense
incurred in preparation for the hearing. Preparation costs are an
inevitable part of any adjudicative process, whether traditional litigation or
ADR. The justification for these costs is the possible acceptance of the
arbitration award or enhanced settlement negotiations.1 4 If CAA does not
resolve disputes, then this is an additional cost for parties that proceed to
trial."' The imposition of these costs is justified only if the litigants and
the courts receive some benefit from the process."' Those who arbitrate
and then proceed to trial receive no benefit; those who accept the award
receive the maximum benefit; and the value to those who settle between
the hearing date and trial is unclear. It is the effectiveness of the
proceeding itself that justifies the expense of preparation as an inevitable,
but worthwhile, cost. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of CAA is one
more reason to keep these costs as low as possible. The cost of
preparation can be limited by using an abbreviated and informal
procedure. As long as discovery for purposes of court-annexed arbitration
is limited in scope and the proceeding is kept simple, these costs do not
create undue settlement pressure, or are at least justified in the
experimental stages of CAA.
Courts consider delay and preparation expense a permissible side
effect of court-annexed arbitration. At least one court, however, has
looked unfavorably on excessive delays (more than one year) created by
the operation of a program." 7 A well-designed and administered program
can avoid unnecessary delay by requiring arbitration within a set period of
time and providing for strict adherence to deadlines." 8  Another
suggestion that commentators have made to reduce cost and delay is to
use one arbitrator instead of panels of three to five." 9  Simplicity of
procedure also maintains speedy processing and reduces preparation
costs. "o
114. See JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 5, at 82 (litigants' costs
are saved only if there is no trial de novo).
115. For a discussion of the dangers of increasing costs without resolving disputes, see
Rowe, supra note 24, at 900-01; Note, supra note 86, at 412-14.
116. Id.
117. Mattas v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 388; 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
118. See Note, supra note 86, at 414; SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 107, at 87.
119. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at 88-89 (suggesting the use of one
arbitrator instead of three); N.J. AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION, supra note 112, at 73
(reduction of number of arbitrators has no effect on the trial de novo rate).
120. Increasing the formality of CAA may create a desire for additional preparation
time, which may lead to corresponding delays. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 5, at
89-90. Additional procedural requirements may unnecessarily impose these additional costs
on the parties. Litigants see informality as one of the benefits of CAA, in comparison to the
formalities of trial. See N.J. AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION, supra note 112, at 73; SIMPLE
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V. EVALUATING SANCTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE CONSTRAINTS AND
PURPOSES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The main objection to the use of sanctions in connection with
court-annexed arbitration is the creation of additional pressure to accept
the results of a mandatory extrajudicial proceeding. Binding arbitration
does not offend traditional notions of fairness because the parties have
contracted to settle their differences outside of the judicial system. Nor
does it seem overly burdensome to require parties to submit to a brief,
nonbinding procedure prior to exercising their right to access to the
courts. Problems arise when the two ideas are combined due to
overzealousness to ease court congestion.
Forcing parties to resort exclusively to extrajudicial alternatives to
trial is clearly in conflict with the policies underlying the judicial system.
Courts do not have the authority under local rule, and legislators should
not restrict access to the courts through the circuitous route of increasing
sanctions for rejecting the results of alternative dispute resolution. While
restricting some parties' access to the courts, coercive sanctions may not
even yield the desired result of easing court congestion. Furthermore, the
creation of side litigation offsets the benefits of alternative dispute
resolution for both the court and the litigants.
Court-annexed arbitration is a hybrid between an early, informal
adjudication and a settlement device. At its best, it provides the parties
with a hearing on the merits of their case, and serves as a catalyst for
early settlement. At its worst, it creates additional time and expense for
litigants that are determined to proceed to trial and forces other litigants to
settle for "second-class justice." Excessive sanctions significantly increase
the danger of creating the second type of court-annexed arbitration
program: unjust and coercive.
Sharon A. Jennings
JUSTICE, supra note 107, at 83.
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